—(1) If, on the date when any right of action accrued for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, the person to whom it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of —
in the case of actions to which section 24A(2) applies, 3 years; or
from the date when the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred, notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired.
(2) In any case to which section 29 applies, subsection (1) shall apply as if the date from which the period of limitation begins to run were substituted for the date when the right of action accrued.
(3) Where any such person as is referred to in subsection (1) was on such date under two disabilities or where before the disability which he was under on such date had ceased he was affected by another disability, he shall be deemed for the purposes of this section to have continued under a disability until both the disabilities have ceased.
(4) When one of several joint creditors or claimants is under any such disability, and when a discharge can be given without the concurrence of that person, time will run against them all.
(5) Where no discharge under subsection (4) can be given, time will not run as against any of them until all those persons cease to be under a disability or until one of them becomes capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence of the others whichever shall first occur.
(6) This section shall take effect subject to the following provisions:
nothing in this section shall affect any case where the right of action first accrued to some person not under a disability through whom the person under a disability claims;
when a right of action which has accrued to a person under a disability accrues, on the death of that person while still under a disability, to another person under a disability no further extension of time shall be allowed by reason of the disability of the second person;
no action to recover land or money charged on land for which a period of limitation is prescribed under this Act shall be brought by virtue of this section by any person after the expiration of 30 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to that person or some person through whom he claims;
nothing in this section shall apply to any action to recover a penalty or forfeiture, or sum by way thereof, by virtue of any written law, except where the action is brought by an aggrieved party.
Time limits for negligence, nuisance and breach of duty actions in respect of latent injuries and damage
—(1) This section shall apply to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of a provision made by or under any written law or independently of any contract or any such provision).
(2) An action to which this section applies, where the damages claimed consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person, shall not be brought after the expiration of —
3 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued; or
3 years from the earliest date on which the plaintiff has the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant injury, if that period expires later than the period mentioned in paragraph (a).
(3) An action to which this section applies, other than one referred to in subsection (2), shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of —
6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued; or
3 years from the earliest date on which the plaintiff or any person in whom the cause of action was vested before him first had both the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage and a right to bring such an action, if that period expires later than the period mentioned in paragraph (a).
(4) In subsections (2) and (3), the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant injury or damage (as the case may be) means knowledge —
that the injury or damage was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty;
of the identity of the defendant;
if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, of the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant; and
of material facts about the injury or damage which would lead a reasonable person who had suffered such injury or damage to consider it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.
(5) Knowledge that any act or omission did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach of duty is irrelevant for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3).
(6) For the purposes of this section, a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire —
from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or
from facts ascertainable by him with the help of appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek.
(7) A person shall not be taken by virtue of sub-section (6) to have knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.
Overriding time limit for negligence, nuisance and breach of duty actions involving latent injuries and damage
—(1) An action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty to which section 24A applies shall not be brought after the expiration of 15 years from the starting date.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1),
“starting date” means the date (or, if more than one, from the last of the dates) on which there occurred any act or omission —
which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty; and
to which the injury or damage in respect of which damages are claimed is alleged to be attributable (in whole or in part).
(3) This section bars the right of action in a case to which subsection (1) applies notwithstanding that the cause of action has not yet accrued before the end of the period of limitation prescribed by this section.
—(1) Nothing in section 24A shall —
enable any action to be brought which was barred by this Act immediately before 26th June 1992; or
affect any action commenced before 26th June 1992.
25. Where letters of administration of the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the time prescribed for an action to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues.
—(1) Where any right of action has accrued to recover land or to enforce a mortgage or charge in respect of land or personal property, and —
the person in possession of the land or personal property acknowledges the title of the person to whom the right of action has accrued; or
in the case of any such action by a mortgagee or chargee the person in possession as aforesaid or the person liable for the debt secured by the mortgage or charge makes any payment in respect thereof, whether of principal or interest,
the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment.
(2) Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment.
(3) A payment of a part of the rent or interest due at any time shall not extend the period for claiming the remainder of the rent or interest then due, but any payment of interest shall have effect, for the purposes of subsection (2) only, as if it were a payment in respect of the principal debt.
—(1) Every such acknowledgment as is referred to in section 26 shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment.
(2) Any such acknowledgment or payment as is referred to in section 26 may be made by the agent of the person by whom it is required to be made under that section, and shall be made to the person, or to an agent of the person, whose title or claim is being acknowledged or, as the case may be, in respect of whose claim the payment is being made.
—(1) For the purposes of this Act, an acknowledgment of the title to any land, or mortgaged or charged property by any person in possession thereof shall bind all other persons in possession during the ensuing period of limitation.
(2) A payment in respect of a debt secured by a mortgage or charge by the mortgagor or any person in possession of the mortgaged or charged land or personal property shall, so far as any right of the mortgagee or chargee to foreclose or otherwise to recover the property is concerned, bind all other persons in possession of the mortgaged property during the ensuing period of limitation.
(3) Where there are 2 or more mortgagors of land or personal property and the title or right to redemption of one of the mortgagors is acknowledged as aforesaid, the acknowledgment shall be deemed to have been made to all the mortgagors.
(4) An acknowledgment of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind the acknowledgor and his successors but not any other person.
(5) An acknowledgment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind any successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of a preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of the acknowledgment.
(6) A payment made in respect of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind all persons liable in respect thereof.
(7) A payment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind any person other than the person making the payment and his successors and shall not bind any successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of a preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of the payment.
(8) An acknowledgment by one of several personal representatives of any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person, or to any share or interest therein, or a payment by one of several personal representatives in respect of any such claim shall bind the estate of the deceased person.
(9) In this section,
“successor”, in relation to any mortgagee or person liable in respect of any debt or claim, means his personal representatives and any other person on whom the rights under the mortgage or, as the case may be, the liability in respect of the debt or claim devolve, whether on death or bankruptcy or the disposition of property or the determination of a limited estate or interest in settled property or otherwise.
—(1) Where, in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act —
the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or his agent or of any person through whom he claims or his agent;
the right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or
the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake,
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or the mistake, as the case may be, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall enable any action to be brought to recover, or enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property which —
in the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that any fraud had been committed; or
in the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable consideration, subsequently to the transaction in which the mistake was made, by a person who did not know or have reason to believe that the mistake had been made.